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Introduction
Xenotransplantation - the transplantation of an-
imal cells, tissues or organs into humans to treat
diseases, could be an alternative to other meth-
ods. Xenotransplantation products could func-
tion for prolonged periods when given to recip-
ients who survive for many years. Xenotrans-
plantation is a public health concern because it
has the potential to infect human recipients
with infectious agents that do not ordinarily in-
fect humans, thereby introducing new infection
to humans. It combines a potential benefit with
a potential risk to humans that is presently un-
known.
Quality control
The quality of xenotransplantation can not be
guaranteed only by control of the finished prod-
uct. Great emphasis should be placed on the ori-
gin and testing of the source animal, on the con-
trols of animal facilities and animal husbandry,
on the manufacturing and on the final release
testing of the product. The risk of infectious
disease is mainly dependent on the choice of
source animal to be used. Each species will
raise its own microbiological and virological
concerns which should be addressed. 
Six groups of viral infections that theoretically
may be transmitted to humans are listed as ex-
amples. Each group of viral infection has its
own risk level. 
1. Zoonoses, such as influenza A, Nipah, rabies
and others,
2. Possible or potential zoonoses, such as
porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERVs),
and others,
3. Common animal viruses that normally do
not infect man, such as classical swine fever,
cytomegalovirus, parvovirus, and others,
4. Viruses that normally do not infect pigs (or
any animal species), but have incidentally
been reported to infect pigs (or any animal
species), which include lyphocytic chori-
omeningitis, Hantaan virus, and others,
5. New viruses that may arise due to recombi-
nation of retroviral human and e.g. porcine
sequences, or due to the formation of pseu-
dotypes, e.g. a hybrid virus carrying the
genome of one virus and (part of) the enve-
lope of another, or re-assortment in the case
of influenza viruses. 
6. Yet unknown viruses. For example in the last
years DNA sequences of three novel differ-
ent gammaherpesviruses have been re-
ported, indicating there is a chance for the
presence of yet unknown pig viruses in pigs. 
Source of animals and testing for infectious
agents
A wide range of source animals is possible. The
strategy adapted should be such as minimize
potential microbiological and virological con-
tamination. Founder animals are the animals
from which source animals are initially bred.
Source animals to the animal barrier facility
could be derived using three different systems:
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1. Germ-free gnotobiotic founder animals. The
establishment of gnotobiotic animals requires
delivery by hysterectomy and maintenance in
isolators under positive air pressure for the en-
tire life span. These animals are devoid of all in-
fectious agents except for those that are trans-
mitted in the germline, e.g. endogenous
retrovirus, or via intrauterine or transplacental
pathways. 2. Specific pathogen free (SPF)
founder animals. The establishment of SPF an-
imals can be achieved by hysterectomy of the
dams and maintaining SPF breeding units of
the descendent animals under barrier condi-
tions to produce source animals. 3. Founder an-
imals free of designated pathogens. Source an-
imals should, at minimum, be free of specific
pathogens (SPF) and raised in specific facilities
with barrier controls and documented health
screening programs. All infectious agents
known to infect the species have to be consid-
ered.
Source animals should be maintained in accor-
dance with standard operating procedures ap-
propriate to the species. Procedures should be
developed to identify incidents that negatively
affect the health of the herd or colony. Source
animals should be maintained in barrier facili-
ties. Protocols for monitoring the herd for dis-
ease and infectious agents have to exist. Spe-
cific screening procedures should include
appropriate physical examination and labora-
tory tests. All infectious agents known to infect
the source species have to be considered e.g.
viruses, bacteria, mycoplasma, fungi, TSEs and
parasites. All animals entering the facility have
to have a defined quarantine period allowing for
completion of screening procedures. The con-
trol of genetically modified animals should be
at least the same as for non-genetically modi-
fied animals.
Source animal facilities have to be adequately
designed and inspected by competent authori-
ties. There have to be plans for shelter, the feed-
ing area, washing areas, air handling systems
and other physical attributes of the animal envi-
ronment. Records of any biological or physical
compromise of the animal environment and
measures taken in response to this problem
have to be available. When source animals die
or are euthanized, a full necropsy should be per-
formed and archival samples should be ob-
tained for storage. When the source animal is
killed at the time its live cells or tissues are har-
vested, a full necropsy is conducted including
gross, histopathological and microbiological
evaluation. Archival samples, including por-
tions of the product, should be obtained for
storage.
Risk of infectious disease
The risks of most of the viruses and the non-vi-
ral micro-organisms can be substantially re-
duced or even eliminated by breeding animals
in a barriered environment, where they are reg-
ularly screened for the absence of infection
from a wide spectrum of viruses, bacteria, par-
asites et cetera. It is obvious that even breeding
and keeping animals under barriered conditions
may not exclude hitherto unknown viruses. It is
also difficult, if not impossible, to safeguard
against novel viruses that emerge for recombi-
nation events. A major concern is the potential
for the occurrence and spread of unknown, as
well as known, animal diseases into man. Meth-
ods to remove PERVs from the genome, are not
currently available, and these viruses pose the
most obvious risk at present.                  
Conclusions
Xenotransplantation carries a significant risk of
infection, not only for the recipient but also for
the population at large. It is possible that in an
immunosuppressed host a xenogeneic infection
may occur. Transmission of pathogens from
transplanted animal cells to the human host
may be involved, or new diseases may arise in
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the host caused by hitherto unknown
pathogens. A disease may be established and
transmitted to others in the community. There
might also be difficulties in recognising and di-
agnosing such an event at an early stage of the
evolvement of such new diseases. 
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